Why Don't We Rob More?

By Nitin Misra (Co-Founder, indiagold) · 2025-03-07 · 8 min read

Took this photo in 2022 of a van that had just filled an ATM with cash. The cash was in the red backpack & the van needed a long push start. While my initial thoughts were how unsafe this was, later I realised that this is not a bug, its a feature :-)

We so often get asked that why don't people on the streets or employees just run away with the gold. Many expect an answer rooted in security practices or technology, however the reasons are primarily social & cultural rather than security or technology led i.e., the math ain't mathing !!!

Disclosure: I'm no sociologist or an expert in criminology - this is a purely an objective take from the lens of the sector I'm in.

First, the scale of the anomaly

India averages 2–3 robberies per 100,000 people per year. The world average is 119 per 100,000. That makes India roughly 40–60x below the global average — an outlier that's hard to explain because security systems are not state of the art.

Robbery in India has actually declined since 1953 — from 8,407 cases at a rate of 2.24 per 100,000 to 18,456 cases in absolute terms, but at a lower rate of 1.59 per 100,000 as population grew. More people, fewer robberies per capita. The opposite of what you'd expect in a growing, unequal economy.

Petty thefts could be routinely downgraded or ignored to make numbers look better however this is not the case with branch robberies - they are genuinely low because NBFCs/banks are insured and highly regulated.

So what's actually going on?

1. The "Rational Criminal" math is catastrophically bad in India

Think of a bank robbery like a startup pitch. You need capital (weapons, planning, a team), you have a very uncertain payoff (₹5–15 lakh if it goes well), and your downside is 7–10 years under the Arms Act plus IPC Sections for robbery/dacoity. The expected value calculation for a potential Indian criminal is objectively terrible — especially when alternative crimes (cyber fraud, extortion, petty theft) have better payoff-to-risk ratios.

Even in the US, where armed robberies are far more common, only about 12% of bank robberies result in the perpetrator actually getting money. The average successful take was around $7,500. In India, where escape routes are worse and social density higher, that expected yield collapses further.

2. The "Bystander Mob" effect — uniquely Indian and massively underappreciated

This is probably the single biggest deterrent that never shows up in security literature. In India, the social response to a crime in progress is collective physical action, not passive compliance. If someone shouts "chor!" in a busy market, 10–20 people immediately chase and often apprehend the person — sometimes violently.

This is the exact opposite of the Western social norm where bystanders are conditioned to step back and let police handle it. A branch sitting inside or adjacent to a busy bazaar, market, or commercial lane is essentially surrounded by an informal "vigilante network" at all times.

The potential bank robber has to mentally model not just "will the guard stop me?" but "will the 30 people outside the chai stall chase my vehicle?" That's an entirely different risk calculation.

3. Urban density and "eyes on the street" — Jane Jacobs in practice

Most Indian bank branches and NBFC offices are not in isolated suburban strip malls with empty parking lots. They're embedded in dense commercial fabric — between a saree shop and a medical store, on a road with autorickshaw drivers parked outside all day, vendors on the footpath, people standing at every corner.

Research on Indian crime patterns shows that "crime and deviant behaviour is found more in big cities than small towns or rural areas" specifically because dense, known communities maintain natural surveillance and guardianship. Ironically, what looks like chaos — crowded streets, no clear sight lines — is actually maximum natural surveillance.

An empty, well-lit, CCTV-equipped branch in a quiet suburb is more vulnerable, not less. The crowd is the security system.

4. Extreme difficulty of acquiring firearms

A credible bank robbery requires a credible threat of lethal force — which in practice means a gun. In India, obtaining an illegal firearm is itself a major criminal undertaking with its own arrest risk, cost, and network requirement. Unlike the US where the shadow supply of illegal weapons is vast and accessible, in India getting armed enough to rob a bank is a significant barrier to entry.

Most Indian dacoities use crude weapons — rods, knives, country made pistols. These don't create the same psychological control over a room full of people and a guard that a modern firearm does. The weapon acquisition problem acts as a filter.

5. Post-robbery escape logistics in India are genuinely terrible

This one is structural. Cash management van robberies are rare partly because the van can't actually accelerate away. Traffic in Indian cities means the getaway vehicle is stuck behind an autorickshaw within 200 meters. CCTV is now at most major intersections. Everybody has a smartphone. The escape problem — which in American films involves high-speed highway chases — in India involves being stuck at a signal with 40 people having already recorded your vehicle's number.

6. The monetization problem has gotten worse post-2016

Even if you successfully rob ₹20 lakh in cash, what do you do with it? Post-demonetization and with UPI now tracking large cash conversions, depositing or spending suspicious cash has become meaningfully harder. For gold loan NBFCs specifically, the stolen gold has to be melted or sold — which requires a specific buyer network and creates its own paper trail. Cash and gold are both harder to launder in India today than they were 10 years ago. The "exit" problem has made the crime less attractive even if entry were easy.

7. Cultural relationship with institutional authority

There's a documented pattern in Indian society of loyalty and subservience to authority — social and administrative — that creates a psychological barrier to violent crimes targeting institutions. Robbing a "bank" or a formal financial institution carries a different psychological weight than stealing from an individual. There's a cultural taboo around attacking something perceived as an institution or government-proximate structure — even private banks occupy this psychological space.

This isn't unique to India; it shows up across South and East Asian cultures.

8. The criminal "opportunity cost" has shifted to digital

Organized crime in India has largely migrated toward cyber fraud, digital scams, and white-collar crime — which offer better returns, lower physical risk, harder-to-trace execution, and no requirement to be physically present at the scene. A ₹50 lakh UPI fraud ring run from a rented room in Jamtara is simply a better "business" than a bank robbery. The criminal ecosystem has arbitraged away from physical robbery toward digital crime, which is why cybercrime cases were rising sharply even as physical robbery rates stayed flat.

The counterintuitive conclusion

India's branches look insecure because they are insecure by formal security standards. But they exist inside a social system that is extraordinarily effective at the three things that actually deter robbery: making escape hard, making witness-free operation impossible, and imposing immediate extrajudicial consequences before police even arrive. The security system isn't in the branch — it's the 50 people outside it.

Having said that, at indiagold we made the risk even lower using our technology, processes, policies & people.